Coups and Korea

Prime Minister Nouri Kamal al-Maliki does not trust the officer corps in the Iraqi Army, and he admitted exactly that in a CBS interview with Lara Logan I just viewed thanks to CrooksandLiars.com. The Prime Minister of Iraq made a stunning admission that many in his officer corp "may start planning coups, those people do not believe in democracy."

In the exchange he admits that there are many top ranking officers that are loyal to Hussein, which he has to be on guard against a coup. He then goes on to say he does not fear for his safety, or that of the government. Its easy to say that when the U.S. military has 150,000 troops in his country propping up his regime.

Further, he said that the Americans have no influence over the government; rather it is "The Iraqis that tell the Americans what to do," not the other way around.

Now I know he is saying this about America and influence for internal consumption, but does this exchange give any hope for reconciliation? How can there be stability when the Iraqi P.M. himself admits that large parts of his Army are not loyal to the government they serve. And what about the soldiers serving under these generals? Will they follow the directives of the Prime Minister once the Americans pull back from combat, or will they follow their officers who may or may not be loyal to the government? These are serious questions that the Bush Administration would prefer to avoid, and do a good job ignoring.

This brings me to the recent developments in Washington that has the Bush Administration comparing the War in Iraq to the War in Korea. This is a poor model to fashion “plan B” after as it infers that the U.S. will have a massive combat force in Iraq for 50 years. I see no discernable border to defend with thousands of troops behind tall walls with concertina wire and landmines. Though some Baghdad neighborhoods eerily resemble the stark reality of division.

I understand that the model the Bush Administration favors is a small contingent of combat and support troops to ensure the sovereignty of the Iraqi government. If we could achieve that sort of settlement, when American troops can go mingle with the Iraqis in a social environment, pick up girls, get married, bring them back to the states, nothing would please me more. But can anyone foresee that ever happening? Honestly?

The problem with this model is whom are we defending against? In Korea there is a plainly visible enemy, wearing uniforms and fighting in the conventional manner. In Iraq, the enemy comes from within, as the Prime Minister alluded to in his interview with Lara Logan.

President Bush has taken his talking points to al-Qaeda all the time, seemingly forgetting about his surge to end the sectarian blood letting between Sunni and Shiite. Remember that thing? If my memory serves me correct it was the “surge,” the shift in tactics as Mr. Bush called it, which was to bring calm to Baghdad so the many sides could come together and solve the constitutional issues.

In my opinion, and until about 3 months ago the opinion of most senior officers in the U.S. military, the greatest threat to the stability of the Iraqi government is the sectarian wars waging throughout the country.

The fact that Mr. Bush says "Al-Qaeda is public enemy number one in Iraq's young democracy,” yet fails to mention the sectarian wars going on in Iraq, while Prime Minister Maliki states that he is concerned that the officers corps in the Iraqi Military has mixed loyalties and is on the lookout for a coup, reinforces this serious disconnect I constantly hear from people in Washington, especially the President, versus the events on the ground in Iraq.